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I. Introduction 
Humans have skillfully manufactured a golden age of science.  
The fusion of medical, biological, and technological innovations has 
led to vast insight into human development and treatments for 
conditions previously undiscovered.  By offering highly subsidized 
genetic combination and sequencing tests to pregnant women, 
paired with legal abortions for fetuses with chromosomal 
abnormalities, Iceland is one country, among others, that has 
managed to nearly eradicate the next generation of Down syndrome 
 
† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of North Carolina School of Law.  Executive Editor, 
North Carolina Journal of International Law.  
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babies.1  Similarly, the use of CRISPR technology to alter the genes 
in twin embryos has resulted in the birth of healthy girls to an HIV-
positive father in China.2  In this race to better the whole, science 
and medicine have outpaced technological regulation.  The absence 
of clear international and domestic laws concerning how, when, and 
to what degree prenatal genetic testing and gene editing should be 
used, including the absence of sanctions for their misuse, has 
triggered competing ethical, medical, legal, and sociopolitical views 
on their value.3 
Although medical marvels have made clear that genetic 
technologies have tremendous potential to eliminate communicable 
and fatal conditions, lesser-known debates must also be stressed.  
When such technologies work to instead eliminate entire 
populations—namely, groups among the larger disability 
community, as in Iceland’s case—anxiety over a return to the 
eugenics era arises.  “The disability community lacks a voice in the 
genetics policy arena,”4 yet a scientific revolution is underway to 
prevent their very birth.  The ultimate question is then: is this 
modern-day genocide?  Are genetic researchers and resulting 
practitioners, who intend to eradicate peoples with specific 
chromosomal abnormalities that naturally occur, violating 
international human rights law?  Should deliberately destroying or 
being complicit in the destruction of genetic diversity, albeit for 
 
 1 See Sarah Klucznik & Holly Slepian, Iceland’s Abortion Policy Concerning 
Children with Down Syndrome: An Ethical Analysis, 4 J. HEALTHCARE ETHICS ADMIN. 45, 
46 (July 15, 2018). 
 2 See Rob Stein, Chinese Scientist Says He’s First to Create Genetically Modified 
Babies Using CRISPR, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 26, 2018), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/11/26/670752865/chinese-scientist-says-
hes-first-to-genetically-edit-babies [https://perma.cc/YCU4-HETT]. See Questions and 
Answers About CRISPR, BROAD INSTITUTE, https://www.broadinstitute.org/what-
broad/areas-focus/project-spotlight/questions-and-answers-about-crispr 
[https://perma.cc/KRT6-WNHW] (explaining that “CRISPR” stands for Clustered 
Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats, the bases of a bacterial defense system 
that allows the use of CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing technology.  CRISPR-Cas 9, 
CRISPR-CPF1, and other systems can be programmed to edit DNA at precise locations of 
genetic code in order to modify genes in living cells and organisms and correct disease-
causing mutations). 
 3 See Adam Conti, Drawing the Line: Disability, Genetic Intervention and 
Bioethics, 6 LAWS 1, 12–14 (July 17, 2017). 
 4 See Paul Steven Miller & Rebecca Leah Levine, Avoiding Genetic Genocide: 
Understanding Good Intentions and Eugenics in the Complex Dialogue between the 
Medical and Disability Communities, 15 GENETIC MED. 95 (Feb. 2013). 
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alleged communal good, be punished? 
The elements required to satisfy the legal definition of genocide 
match this phenomenon, but the language of the United Nations’ 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (“Genocide Convention”) is long outdated.5  The 
Convention’s provisions have not been updated since the 
Convention’s adoption by the United Nations General Assembly in 
December 1948.  Thus, this note considers an important renovation 
of the genocide vernacular.  A jus cogens or non-derogable 
international legal principle,6 the doctrine of genocide must be 
reevaluated in order to effectively assist states in: (1) classifying 
otherwise-omitted groups requiring protection, and (2) accurately 
assessing when genetic testing and fetal termination, as examples of 
this technological age’s destructive actions, are justifiably 
practiced.  Mere moral and ethical opposition to these technological 
practices are insufficient to determine their legality. 
This note demonstrates how genetic technologies can reform 
society’s global makeup on a population-wide scale.  It does not 
debate pro-life or pro-choice principles on an individual level, but 
instead contemplates the culpability of state, scientific, and medical 
actors when they systematically engineer an ideal, homogenized 
society.  Part I focuses solely on the use of prenatal genetic tests for 
and against the interests of the disability rights community, in an 
effort to remain timely, as CRISPR’s growth is constantly 
underway.  Part II provides a legal and social background on the 
status of disabled persons, concentrating on Iceland’s present model 
for Down syndrome, and roots this status in international eugenics 
movements.  The Down syndrome population provides a clear 
illustration, as the genetic condition is common, well-researched, 
and manageable with the rise of integrated medical and social 
 
 5 See G.A. Res. 260 A (III), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 260 A (III)] (outlining the legal 
elements of genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members 
of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) 
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”). 
 6 See Genocide, U.N. OFF. ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION & RESP. TO PROTECT 
[hereinafter U.N. Genocide], https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/YU8M-HBKX] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
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support systems; however, this note should be read with an eye 
towards the potential misuse of genetic technologies on the broader 
disability community.  Part III details the etymology of genocide in 
international legal standards, connecting actions to eradicate Down 
syndrome to the crime’s elements.  Parts IV-V propose a judicial 
model to update and extend the Genocide Convention’s reach and 
suggest alternate regulatory frameworks with clear language against 
novel destructions, so as to protect additional groups. 
II. Prenatal Genetic Testing For and Against Disability 
To estimate a child’s potential for developmental disorders, 
providers are able to administer highly accurate prenatal tests for 
expectant mothers, such as amniocentesis,7 chorionic villus 
sampling,8 and, now, a noninvasive analysis of cell-free fetal DNA9 
in a pregnant woman’s blood.10  Genetic disorders may occur by 
aneuploidy (missing or extra chromosomes), trisomy (an extra 
chromosome), monosomy (a missing chromosome), and inherited 
gene mutations.11  As such, results may range from fatal Trisomy 
13—Patau syndrome, a chromosomal condition causing the death 
 
 7 Amniocentesis is an invasive procedure in which a sample of amniotic fluid is 
removed from the uterus to test fetal cells and proteins for certain genetic conditions, such 
as Down syndrome, lung maturity, and fetal infections.  See Amniocentesis, MAYO CLINIC, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/amniocentesis/about/pac-20392914 
[https://perma.cc/CC2S-S25U] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
 8 Chorionic villus sampling is an invasive procedure in which a sample of placental 
tissue is removed to reveal chromosomal conditions in the fetal genetic makeup, such as 
Down syndrome and cystic fibrosis.  See Chorionic Villus Sampling, MAYO CLINIC, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/chorionic-villus-sampling/about/pac-
20393533 [https://perma.cc/9MHG-3LTW] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
 9 Prenatal cell-free DNA screening is a noninvasive method to screen for 
chromosomal abnormalities in the fetus, such as Down syndrome, trisomy 13, trisomy 18, 
and rhesus blood type, by extracting DNA from the mother and fetus through a maternal 
blood sample.  See Prenatal Cell-free DNA Screening, MAYO CLINIC, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/noninvasive-prenatal-testing/about/pac-
20384574 [https://perma.cc/K5L4-YJYL] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
 10 See Kruti Acharya, Prenatal Testing for Intellectual Disability: Misperceptions 
and Reality with Lessons from Down syndrome, 17 DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITES RES. 
REV. 27 (2011); Gareth M. Thomas & Barbara Katz Rothman, Keeping the Backdoor to 
Eugenics Ajar?: Disability and the Future of Prenatal Screening, 18 [J]AMA ETHICS 406, 
406 (Apr. 2016). 
 11 FAQ Prenatal Genetic Diagnostic Tests, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & 
GYNECOLOGISTS (ACOG), https://www.acog.org/Patients/FAQs/Prenatal-Genetic-
Diagnostic-Tests [https://perma.cc/USF3-STQ4] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
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of infants with severe intellectual disabilities and physical defects 
within the first week of life12—to manageable Trisomy 21, also 
known as Down syndrome, a common genetic disorder causing a 
distinct facial appearance, intellectual disability, developmental 
delays, and a higher likelihood of cardiovascular concerns.13  
Prenatal genetic tests can be more than 99 percent accurate in 
diagnosing chromosomal abnormalities, especially Down 
syndrome.14  Additionally, the physical risks associated with most 
prenatal tests, such as spontaneous miscarriage, are small.15 
Prenatal testing can be beneficial to inform parents about a 
fetus’ normal or abnormal genotype and assist providers in 
adequately managing both the mother and baby’s care.16  As 
expectant parents are often instinctively nervous about their unborn 
child’s physical and cognitive development, test results enable 
parents to prepare for raising a potentially disabled child, or assist 
in guiding their decisions to terminate a pregnancy.17  Parents’ 
exercise of agency and control during this process empowers them 
to receive: (1) accurate medical information on diagnostic 
probabilities; (2) psychosocial information on what the child’s 
physical and mental capabilities may be; (3) support from a trained 
counselor as referred by their medical provider; (4) advice from 
other parents of disabled children; and, overall, (5) the time and 
space to process the diagnosis before deciding whether to continue 
forward with the pregnancy.18  Moreover, pro-information laws, 
endorsed by disability activists, further require doctors and genetic 
 
 12 Trisomy 13, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, NAT. INST. OF HEALTH (NIH), 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/trisomy-13 [https://perma.cc/SBM8-Q6QR] (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2019). 
 13 Down syndrome, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/down-syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc-20355977 [https://perma.cc/YBJ6-
X8XP] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
 14 Chorionic Villus Sampling: CVS, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, 
http://americanpregnancy.org/prenatal-testing/chorionic-villus-sampling/ 
[https://perma.cc/RP67-3YS6] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019); Amniocentesis, DARTMOUTH-
HITCHCOCK, https://www.dartmouth-hitchcock.org/obstetrics/amniocentesis.html 
[https://perma.cc/L7J6-7GMZ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
 15 See Ruth Graham, Choosing Life With Down Syndrome, SLATE (May 31, 2018), 
https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/05/how-down-syndrome-is-redefining-the-
abortion-debate.html [https://perma.cc/4Z4V-MZ6Q]. 
 16 See Acharya, supra note 10, at 1. 
 17 See id. at 2. 
 18 See Graham, supra note 15. 
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counselors to deliver a more “balanced” portrait of disability at 
diagnosis.19  Parents receive expert-prepared information on 
developmental, educational, and psychosocial outcomes, as well as 
contacts for resource centers, clearinghouses, and support 
services.20  Although the pro-information movement initially 
garnered support from pro-life, pro-choice, and disability rights 
groups, it has recently shifted to a partisan anti-abortion movement 
in pursuit of a greater agenda prohibiting pregnancy termination.21 
Before discussing the historical, legal, and social status of 
individuals with disability, particularly how their diagnoses have 
been perceived, it is important to note the limitations of genetic 
testing that may render termination premature.  Prenatal genetic 
screenings cannot predict the precise cognitive abilities of a child in 
utero that has been diagnosed with an abnormal genotype or an 
inherited condition.22  Prenatal tests cannot determine if a child will 
show any symptoms of the disorder, how severe the symptoms will 
be, or whether the disorder will progress or improve over time.23  
Thus, screening results presently lack the detailed accuracy required 
to develop clear treatment strategies for many genetic disorders.24  
The publicity accompanying prenatal screenings has also primarily 
labeled them advantageous for diagnosing and subsequently 
avoiding Down syndrome, but 90 percent of intellectual disability 
is attributed to other conditions, some of which are still unknown.25  
With false negative tests, results may state that a particular 
condition is absent, yet the condition or other abnormalities could 
be present—“it is unknown how explicitly genetic counselors and 
 
 19 See id. 
 20 See Arvind Suresh, Are laws pertaining to Down syndrome genetic counseling 
cause for concern?, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (Aug. 24, 2015), 
https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2015/08/24/are-laws-pertaining-to-down-syndrome-
genetic-counseling-a-cause-for-concern/ [https://perma.cc/8SWM-S8CJ]. 
 21 See Graham, supra note 15. 
 22 See Acharya, supra note 10; see also Thomas & Rothman, supra note 10, at 408 
(Diagnostic tests can only tell if a fetus does or does not have a specific chromosomal 
marker, not the “level of the physical or cognitive impairments the child would have . . .  
[or the] severity or the breadth of impairments that may follow . . . .”). 
 23 See What are the Risks and Limitations of Genetic Testing?, NAT. INST. OF HEALTH 
(NIH) [hereinafter “NIH, Risks and Limitations”], 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/riskslimitations [https://perma.cc/AC3D-PDX3]. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Acharya, supra note 10, at 30. 
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physicians inform patients of this fact.”26  Non-invasive direct-to-
consumer tests via the internet or popular companies, such as 
23andMe,27 may prove even less predictive with their debated 
accuracy and the general dearth of global safety regulations in this 
space.28  Additional emotional, social, and financial consequences 
may plague a patient with positive results, triggering poor mental 
health, family tension, and possible genetic discrimination in 
employment or insurance claims and actuarial calculations.29 
III. Eugenics and the Socio-Legal Status of Disability 
Over time, tailored innovations have significantly extended the 
life expectancy of persons with disabilities—for Down syndrome, 
to almost 60 years today as compared to 12 years in 1949—and 
expanded their acceptance in the larger global community.30  The 
global Disability Rights Movement, led by disabled activists in the 
1970s, resulted in the landmark United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) passed in 2006.31  
Ratified by more than 170 countries, the CRPD has ensured a shift 
in global disability initiatives, incorporated in the 2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals, and has influenced disability advocacy groups 
to collect and aggregate data on how people with disabilities fare in 
 
 26 See id. at 28. 
 27 23ANDME, INC., https://www.23andme.com/ [https://perma.cc/PT9J-9J4S] (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2019). 
 28 See Heather Skirton, Direct to Consumer Testing in Reproductive Contexts – 
Should Health Professionals Be Concerned?, 11 LIFE SCI., SOC’Y, & POLICY 4 (Dec. 2015). 
 29 See NIH, Risks and Limitations, supra note 23.  See, e.g., Kathleen Stanton, The 
Unwanted Ones, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Mar. 1, 1989), 
https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/the-unwanted-ones-6412883 
[https://perma.cc/2SF8-3SLZ] (explaining how Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Arizona 
would not cover a family’s daughter with Down syndrome in their new policy because 
“she was uninsurable” due to medical statistics that children with Down syndrome have a 
higher incidence of heart defects and other illnesses.  Note: This article pre-dates the 
Affordable Care Act); Birgit Kuschke, Disability discrimination in insurance, 51 DE JURE 
(PRETORIA) 50, 52–53, n.10 (2018) (discussing that, in various countries, insurance 
companies are in the business of discrimination, as they must segregate insureds into 
different risk pools based on risk profiles and most commonly price premiums based on 
age, gender, and disability.  For example, coverage eligibility differs for an individual with 
Down syndrome, as their life expectancy can be relatively short, they must receive 
consistent medication, or they require specialized treatments at great cost).   
 30 See Graham, supra note 15. 
 31 G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007). 
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society as compared to non-disabled peers.32  Resultant universal 
design mechanisms are increasingly enabling disabled individuals 
to navigate their communities, such as access to urban structures, 
computer and smartphone services, medical treatments and 
supplies, psychosocial services, and integrated classroom 
education.33  While larger strides are required to include disabled 
individuals in employment, prioritize their wellbeing in emergency 
and disaster relief, and equalize their social opportunities to marry 
and procreate, the global community has come a long way towards 
acceptance in recent times.34  Notably, improving societal systems 
has led individuals with Down syndrome to attain higher degrees; 
become mainstream award-winning actors, models, and singers;35 
and even serve as public officials, such as Angela Bachiller, a 
Spanish city councilor of the People’s Party,36 and Kayla McKeon, 
the first registered Capitol Hill lobbyist with Down syndrome.37 
A. Wrongful Life and Birth Suits 
Though there have been positive advancements, not all changes 
in the disability realm have been progressive.  With the advent of 
genetic screening technologies, a range of wrongful life and 
wrongful birth tort lawsuits have arisen that rely on and reiterate the 
notion of living with a disability as defective and deficient—an 
ongoing injury requiring a remedy.38  Wrongful life claims are 
actions brought by or on behalf of a child against his parents for his 
 
 32 See Nora Ellen Groce, Global Disability: An Emerging Issue, 6 THE LANCET 724, 
725 (July 1, 2018). 
 33 See id. 
 34 See id.; see also Miller & Levine, supra note 4, at 97–98. 
 35 See List of People With Down Syndrome, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_people_with_Down_syndrome 
[https://perma.cc/PT9J-9J4S] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019). 
 36 See Alba Tobella Mayans, Valladolid Appoints Spain’s First Down Syndrome 
Councillor, EL PAIS (Aug. 8, 2013), 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2013/08/08/inenglish/1375970149_703675.html 
[https://perma.cc/2DY4-KEBH]. 
 37 See Courtney Perkes, New York Woman Is Nation’s First Lobbyist With Down 
Syndrome, DISABILITYSCOOP (Jun. 26, 2018), 
https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2018/06/26/new-first-lobbyist-down-syndrome/25237/ 
[https://perma.cc/SF76-WNDG]. 
 38 See Paola Frati, et al., Preimplantation and Prenatal Diagnosis, Wrongful Birth 
and Wrongful Life: A Global View of Bioethical and Legal Controversies, 23 HUMAN 
REPROD. UPDATE 338, 343–44 (May 1, 2017). 
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birth, claiming that he has to endure a life not worth living,39 
whereas wrongful birth claims are brought by the parents against a 
physician for not fully informing the parents of the potential for 
disability or not offering amniocentesis to avoid the birth of their 
unwanted disabled child.40  For both suits, damages may amount to 
maintenance costs for the disability.41  Although courts worldwide 
have been reluctant to acknowledge wrongful life claims—owing to 
contested ethical concepts of existence and survival as injuries, 
whether there is a right not to be born, and non-existence as a better 
alternative to a disabled life—international judicial systems have 
acknowledged wrongful birth actions.42  The majority of U.S. states 
allow wrongful birth actions, as do many European countries, which 
have awarded substantial compensation for the disabled child’s 
support costs, parents’ loss of earnings, and special disability 
education expenses.43 
It may be logically flawed, however, to substantiate wrongful 
birth claims by medical malpractice.  In this context, negligence 
occurs when healthcare professionals breach a duty of care owed to 
expectant parents and, thereby, violate parents’ self-determination 
to pursue or terminate a pregnancy, leading to additional costs of 
raising a child.44  The physician’s negligence can take the form of 
failing to conduct prenatal genetic tests, failing to counsel the 
patient on the results, and failing to offer or conduct an abortion.45  
The physician’s negligence here, however, is not a direct or 
proximate cause of the fetal abnormality.  The child is or would be 
disabled or chronically ill, regardless of the physician’s actions.46  
That global courts are amenable to wrongful birth tort claims and 
award sizable damages reinforces eugenics underpinnings, 
devaluing the life of children born with impairments.47  In this 
 
 39 See id. at 346–48. 
 40 See id. at 343–46. 
 41 See id. at 343. 
 42 See id. at 343–48 (“[T]he international scenarios highlights the fact that the courts 
have overwhelmingly rejected wrongful life actions while at the same time approving 
those for wrongful birth.”). 
 43 See Frati et al., supra note 38, at 344–45. 
 44 See id. at 351. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See id. at 352. 
 47 See id. at 348–49 (providing examples of two Australian courts’ decisions in 2006 
not to calculate damages because a disabled person’s life should not be devalued and there 
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manner, the injuries of physician negligence and interference with 
patient autonomy are conflated with a labeled injury of a disabled 
life.  Some disability rights groups maintain that, through wrongful 
birth suits, disability is judicially upheld as an unwanted and 
undesirable trait for parents, the child, and society.48  In other words, 
by offering a compensatory remedy, courts buttress the rhetoric of 
disability as a tragedy that is certain to cause a poor quality and 
painful life, deserving of substantial damages.49 
B. Effects Felt by the Disability Community: “Ashley X” and 
Iceland’s Example 
This view of disability is not without influence on the disability 
community.  When medicine and science are constantly searching 
for a cure to eliminate various disabilities, “the disability 
community hears an aggressive lyric that is paternalistic and 
perhaps genocidal.”50  What procures a rich and fulfilling life for the 
disabled, however, differs among the group and the severity of 
disability experienced.  In the 2004 incident of “Ashley X,” a 6-
year-old girl in the U.S. with developmental disabilities, this clash 
of opinion was apparent when her parents sought hormonal 
treatment, a hysterectomy, and had her breast buds removed to keep 
her “permanently small” and to prevent her from sexually 
developing.51  Her parents rationalized doing so by their personal 
beliefs concerning what would better Ashley’s future and quality of 
life, and what appearance would fit the condition that left her with 
the cognitive ability and physical development of an infant.52  
Despite sanctions by local disability authorities for infringing on 
Ashley’s fundamental liberty and privacy without a court order, her 
physicians continued to perform the “Ashley Treatment,” an 
involuntary sterilization, on other disabled children at parents’ 
 
is an absence of causal relationship between medical practice and the birth of a disabled 
child). 
 48 See Frati et al, supra note 38, at 344–46. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See Miller & Levine, supra note 4, at 98. 
 51 See Ed Pilkington, The Ashley Treatment: ‘Her Life is as Good as We Can Possibly 
Make It,’ THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2012), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/mar/15/ashley-treatment-email-exchange 
[https://perma.cc/4BU8-RSLU]. 
 52 See id. 
2020 SCREENING SYNDROMES OUT 173 
requests.53 
In Iceland’s case, the combination of highly subsidized genetic 
screenings, subsequent counseling of expectant mothers, and liberal 
abortion policies have dramatically decreased the number of 
children born each year with Down syndrome.54  In 1975, Iceland 
legalized abortion up until 16 weeks of pregnancy, enabling legal 
termination past the 16-week mark if the mother’s life or health was 
compromised, or if the fetus was expected to have deformities or a 
serious genetic abnormality.55  Yet in May 2019, Iceland’s 
Parliament passed a contested law that extends abortions until the 
end of 22 weeks of pregnancy.56  The law also presents the 
possibility of abortion after the 22-week mark if the fetus is not 
considered “viable,” as defined by physicians.57  Although the law 
insists that an extension on abortion strengthens women’s health 
and rights, medical professionals have stated that later abortions 
present greater health risks.58  Þuríður Harpa Sigurðardóttir, the 
chair of The Organisation of Disabled in Iceland, has voiced her 
disappointment with the law, stating: “We should bear in mind that 
we’re talking about halfway through a pregnancy.  This raises 
questions about what the intent is supposed to be.  It must be in order 
to make it possible to end the life of a fetus with abnormalities or 
disabilities.”59 
Iceland’s universal healthcare system, operated by the Ministry 
 
 53 See id. 
 54 See Klucznik & Slepian, supra note 1, at 45. 
 55 Act on Counseling and Education Regarding Sex and Childbirth and on Abortion 




 56 See Jelena Ciric, Abortion Bill Passed in Icelandic Parliament, ICE. REV. (May 14, 
2019), https://www.icelandreview.com/news/abortion-bill-passed-in-icelandic-
parliament/ [https://perma.cc/8ZC4-JZ3X]. 
 57 Christophe Foltzenlogel, Abortion in Iceland: Increasing Medical Risks in the 
Name of the Right to Health, THE EUR. POST (Apr. 29, 2019), 
http://europeanpost.co/abortion-in-iceland-increasing-medical-risks-in-the-name-of-the-
right-to-health/ [https://perma.cc/Z886-NG45]. 
 58 See id. 
 59 Andie Fontaine, Iceland’s Parliament Passes Landmark Abortion Law, THE 
REYKJAVIK GRAPEVINE (May 14, 2019), https://grapevine.is/news/2019/05/14/icelands-
parliament-passes-landmark-abortion-law/ [https://perma.cc/8RQ4-WN27]. 
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of Welfare for a population of less than 350,000,60 has maximized 
efficiency to virtually remove private hospitals and private 
insurance.61  Converting from the Icelandic Króna, sequencing a 
patient’s DNA costs less than $100, and the government mandates 
that all pregnant women be informed of screening for abnormalities 
and the low cost of combination genetic prescreening tests, 
encompassing an ultrasound, blood test, and amniotic fluid test to 
determine genetic disorders.62  While the government does not 
require women to receive testing, around 80 to 85 percent of 
Icelandic women decide to take the test, and close to 100 percent of 
women given positive results for Down syndrome decide to 
terminate the pregnancy.63  Only one or two babies are born with 
Down syndrome each year in Iceland, typically due to inaccurate 
test results.64  To provide further context, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has estimated that the incidence of Down 
syndrome is between 1 in 1,000 (0.1 percent) to 1 in 1,100 (0.09 
percent) live births worldwide.65  In Iceland, each year about two 
babies are born with Down syndrome out of 4,000-5,000 live 
births.66  Babies born with Down syndrome thus account for only 
0.04-0.05 percent of live births in Iceland, a prevalence significantly 
lower than the WHO’s estimate, likely due to Iceland’s high 
abortion rate.  According to the Down Pride advocacy group, almost 
every Icelandic fetus diagnosed with Down syndrome has been 
aborted since 2008.67 
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Disability rights advocates maintain that, even without a formal 
policy, the Icelandic government pushes mothers to terminate their 
pregnancies by promoting the combination test and free 
counseling.68  For example, Helga Sól Ólafsdóttir, at the Landspitali 
University Hospital, counsels her patients with the phrase: “This is 
your life.  You have the right to choose how your life will look 
like.”69  She counsels from the perspective that terminating Down 
syndrome fetuses should be considered as “end[ing] a possible life 
that may have had a huge complication” and “prevent[s] suffering 
for the child and for the family.”70  Because Iceland’s population is 
largely racially homogenous, activists argue that further 
standardizing its population by intellectual ability and genetic 
composition reflects a negative eugenics agenda that interprets 
Down syndrome individuals as burdensome for society, requiring 
constant expensive care, when they are instead people “who may 
otherwise live and enjoy ordinary li[ves].”71 
There is merit to the claim that advanced medical and genetic 
technologies may alleviate certain physiological and cognitive 
impairments—beneficial in proportion to each condition’s severity, 
unmanageability, and lack of research.  Deeming such treatments 
and the reversal of natural biological processes as an ultimate 
solution, however, forces the disability community to fight for its 
existence and prove its place worthy.  It is instead essential to 
incorporate disabled activists’ distinct point of view and specific 
needs in research and treatment to best define human dignity and 
diminish pain and suffering. 
C. Global Eugenics Movements 
The original connection between eugenics and primitive genetic 
interventions cannot be overlooked.  The ways in which prenatal 
genetic screenings now frame disability echo a return to the 
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eugenics era that globally threatened the existence of disabled 
individuals under the guise of scientific research and societal 
progress.72  In 1883, an English anthropologist, Francis Galton, 
coined the term “eugenics.”73  His research studying the effects of 
human selective mating coincided with Charles Darwin’s notions of 
desired traits for reproductive success and survival of the fittest,74 
and predated James Watson and Francis Crick’s discovery of 
DNA.75  Taken from Greek, “eugenics” defined those “good in 
stock, hereditarily endowed with noble qualities” and “all 
influences that tend in however remote a degree to give to the more 
suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing 
speedily over the less suitable.”76  This pseudo-scientific foundation 
justified “negative eugenics”—measures to remove “undesirable 
traits” from the human gene pool that involved the 
institutionalization of individuals deemed inferior, “feeble minded,” 
and impoverished, as well as restrictions on their ability to 
reproduce and marry.77  Only reproduction of the intellectually and 
physically superior, or positive eugenics, would progress 
humanity.78 
A series of events across the globe, some of which were 
legalized, led to the forced sterilization, euthanasia, segregation, and 
genocide of eugenically undesirable persons.  Two well-known 
incidents aptly demonstrate the eugenics zeitgeist and how it has 
taken form in the modern day.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1927 
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ruling in Buck v. Bell79 is a key first example of how the movement 
reached so far as to be judicially upheld.  The Court classified Carrie 
Buck as an 18-year-old “feeble-minded white woman,” the mother 
of an “illegitimate feeble-minded child,” born to a “feeble-minded 
mother,” and all three individuals—Buck, her child, and her 
mother—were committed to a Virginia institution for epileptics and 
the “feeble-minded.”80  A state statute approved the sterilization of 
“mental defectives” and endorsed the determination of each 
institution’s superintendents for when sterilizing patients would be 
in society’s best interest.81  Buck, however, brought a claim against 
her superintendent’s order for sterilization.82  The state interest was 
to promote the patient’s purported health and society’s welfare, 
given the “important part [of heredity] in the transmission of 
insanity, imbecility, etc.;” thus, the law preconditioned a patient’s 
release on their becoming sterile, in order to prevent the “menace” 
of the patient’s offspring and to ensure that the patient become “self 
supporting.”83  While the law gave notice to the patient and the 
opportunity of a hearing and appeal, the circuit court of the county 
retained ultimate consideration of the evidence and entrance of the 
order—there was no guarantee of an appellate review.84 
In response to Buck’s petition, the Supreme Court, nonetheless, 
rationalized three reasons for holding that Buck had been provided 
due process of law: (1) the statute respected patients’ rights; (2) 
sterilization was a procedure devoid of serious pain or substantial 
danger to life; and (3) Buck’s case saw “scrupulous compliance” 
with the law.85  Furthermore, the Court found that because the 
plaintiff was provided asylum from institutionalization back into 
society, she was not denied equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and, as a result of her sterilization, “the equality aimed 
at [would] be more nearly reached.”86  Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. wrote: 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare 
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may call upon the best citizens for their lives.  It 
would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser 
sacrifices . . . in order to prevent our being swamped 
with incompetence.  It is better for all the world, if 
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring 
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, 
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit 
from continuing their kind . . . .  Three generations 
of imbeciles are enough.87 
Consequently, Buck v. Bell enabled 27 states to continue 
implementing sterilization laws for the intellectually disabled until 
the late-1960s.88  These statutes were upheld under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so long as due 
process rights were “protected,” as in Justice Holmes’ interpretation 
of Carrie Buck’s case, and a compelling state interest was found, 
such as “a legislative dual purpose to prevent the birth of a defective 
child or the birth of a non-defective child that cannot be cared for 
by a defective parent.”89  The subsequent rise of anti-miscegenation 
laws persisting until Loving v. Virginia in 1967 also served to 
preserve white racial purity, ban interracial marriage and, though 
not explicit, preclude the birth of “lesser” mixed-race offspring.90 
The second infamous international eugenics movement took 
form in Nazi Germany, resulting in the Holocaust.91  In 1937, Adolf 
Hitler ordered the sterilization of (1) the Rheinlandbastarde, a 
derogatory term referring to the mixed children of German mothers 
and Africans who served as French colonial troops after World War 
I; (2) the children of German settlers and missionaries who married 
or had illegitimate children with women of other ethnicities; and (3) 
mental patients.92  These forced sterilization laws resulted in 
300,000 to 400,000 sterilizations, further practiced on Jews in 
Auschwitz concentration camps.93  Also at this time, the Nazi 
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regime implemented racial segregation laws and anti-miscegenation 
laws, the combination of which inevitably led to one of the world’s 
most destructive genocides to exterminate racially undesirable 
individuals.94  As such, the Nazis aimed to retain the pure blue-eyed, 
blonde-haired Aryan peoples that would racially and morally 
cleanse the German population.95 
These two cases commonly exhibit one group’s intention to 
eliminate another undesired group.  The methods for elimination 
vary between institutionalization, sterilization, anti-miscegenation, 
racial segregation, encampment, and murder—each a technology of 
the time in which these incidents took place, resulting in the 
riddance of a class of people.  It is possible to transfer these 
intentions to present genetic technologies, sometimes intentionally 
used to screen out and terminate fetuses with disabilities.  If the prior 
incidents were termed genocide, an analysis of the traditional 
genocide etymology may enable the same today. 
IV. The Etymology of Genocide as a Jus Cogens 
Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, coined the word “genocide” in 
1944.96  Genos in Greek means race or tribe and cide in Latin means 
killing.97  Developed in part due to the Holocaust, Lemkin 
campaigned for genocide to be codified as an international crime, 
ensuing in the 1946 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
96(I) and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”).98  The original 
Resolution articulated: 
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of 
entire human groups [emphasis added], as 
homicide is the denial of the right to live of 
individual human beings; such denial of the right of 
existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results 
in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural 
and other contributions represented by these human 
groups [emphasis added], and is contrary to moral 
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law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations.  
Many instances of such crimes of genocide have 
occurred when racial, religious, political and other 
groups [emphasis added] have been destroyed, 
entirely or in part.99 
By January 2018, 149 states had ratified the Convention; yet, 
irrespective of ratification, all states are bound by the same 
obligation to prohibit and sanction the crime.100  This is because the 
International Court of Justice has held genocide to be a jus cogens, 
a peremptory norm of international law that all states, including 
those abstaining from the Convention, may not derogate from under 
any circumstance, peace or war, and, therefore, may not 
denunciate.101 
Article II of the Genocide Convention defines the crime, 
resulting from the negotiations of U.N. member states in 1948.102  It 
is defined in the same terms in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court in Article 6, as well as in the statutes of other 
international jurisdictions.103  Article II of the Genocide Convention, 
however, narrows the 1946 General Assembly language by 
removing the broad application to “other groups”104: 
[G]enocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group 
[emphasis added], as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to 
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another group.105 
The crime’s key chapeau elements,106 or the predicate acts that 
the perpetrator must satisfy, are a mental element—the “intent to 
destroy”—and a physical element, involving acting upon any of the 
five forms of destruction enumerated in Article II.107  A group, and 
not its individual members, must be deliberately targeted, but 
genocide can also be committed against only part of a group, as long 
as that part is identifiable and substantial.108  Since the “physical 
destruction” of a group, in whole or in part, might take generations 
to occur, the International Law Commission has used the term 
“biological destruction” to determine whether the crime of genocide 
has been completed.109  Actual destruction, itself, is not a reliable 
source.110 
Articles III-VI find the following acts punishable for any 
perpetrators involved, whether state rulers, public officials, or 
private individuals, upon a trial by a competent tribunal of the state 
in the territory where the act was committed:111 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide. 
The differences between the 1948 Convention and the 1946 
General Assembly Resolution are easily identifiable, namely that 
the Convention removed the broader “human groups” and “other 
groups” language.  It is unclear exactly why the Convention 
narrowed the pool of protected groups against genocide, but there is 
evidence that the drafters did consider ideological, linguistic, 
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economic, and political groups before excluding them.112  The 
primary rationale offered by scholarship has been that national, 
ethnic, racial, and religious groups have each been targets of 
animosity, characterized by “cohesiveness, homogeneity, 
inevitability of membership, stability, and tradition.”113  The former 
are groups with membership defined by birth, whereas affiliation 
with political groups has been considered a product of individual 
choice and freedom that is mobile over time and regime.114  An 
alternate suggestion for the exclusion of broader groups posits that 
the delegates, at the time of the Convention’s inception, wanted to 
put parallel Soviet extermination practices at Nuremberg “beyond 
the realm of inquiry”—the Soviets maintained that only an “organic 
link” between “genocide” and “Nazism” would disallow 
extermination practices, while other states, such as Poland and 
Venezuela, similarly opposed the broader protection of political 
groups in order to continue their suppression of certain 
insurgencies.115  Because forced sterilization of specific ethnic, 
racial, and mentally deficient groups also remained legalized and in 
global practice well into the 1970s, had the Convention retained a 
broader victim category, a multitude of involved member states 
could have been subject to sanctions.116 
Although the opportunity has presented itself, the text of the 
Convention has not been revised since its adoption in 1948 and 
entrance into force in 1951.117  But now, given the ever-evolving 
role of technology in crimes, warfare, and medical and scientific 
procedures, it is of wonder whether the international law community 
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should use the ejusdem generis approach.118  This analysis enables 
general rules of interpretation to suggest an expansion of the 
doctrine into additional groups that are analogous to those 
enumerated.119 
To make the connection explicit in the case of disability, 
disabled individuals constitute separate groups based on disability 
type and severity—for example, Down syndrome individuals make 
up a singular group.  Down syndrome is one of the more common, 
well-researched, and manageable genetic conditions;120 it is devoid 
of individual choice with genetic determination before birth; and it 
is a stable and irreversible trait.  Genocide’s elements of genocidal 
intent and target group may be found by physicians recommending 
prenatal screenings and counseling for pregnancy termination upon 
a positive result for chromosomal abnormalities, as well as scientists 
and geneticists continually attempting to find new testing and gene 
editing methods for the precise purpose to cure and treat 
compromised conditions.  For Down syndrome, this cure-and-treat 
approach has, instead, meant elimination.  The element of 
destruction then comes from the ultimate result—the termination of 
the disabled group at an identifiable and substantial scale, 
“deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” (Art. II(c)) 
or “[i]mposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group” (Art. II(d)).121  With the International Law Commission’s 
interpretation of “biological destruction,”122 these two forms of 
destruction may not require that the fetus-versus-life debate be 
solved.  Medically recommending termination and ultimately 
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terminating fetuses on a mass scale is destroying the Down 
syndrome group over generations.  That Iceland, just one example 
of its kind, has managed to eradicate a subsequent generation of 
Down syndrome individuals by almost 100 percent well-fits this 
connection.123  Yet excluding “other human groups” from the 
language of the Convention ignores the extinction of peoples with 
Down syndrome and excuses sanctioning those so engaged. 
V. Recommendations to Update the Genocide Convention 
and Implement Global Legislation 
The slow but sure elimination of Down syndrome has been a 
prime case for contemplating the potential misuse of genetic 
technology because it is one of the most common genetic disorders 
for which medical, psychosocial, educative, and urban design 
supports exist and are improving worldwide.124  Correspondingly, a 
2011 survey published by Brian Skotko, a Harvard-trained 
physician and researcher, found that, of 284 participants with Down 
syndrome, “nearly 99 percent . . . indicated that they were happy 
with their lives, 97 percent liked who they are, 96 percent liked how 
they look,” and 86 percent “felt they could make friends easily.”125  
Many participants encouraged healthcare professionals to value 
them, emphasizing that they share similar hopes and dreams as 
people without the condition.126  The small percentage of 
participants who did declare difficulties and sadness, however, had 
uniquely isolating living situations.127 
Despite progressive individual perceptions on leading life with 
Down syndrome, termination rates are still increasing upon 
receiving positive prenatal test results, not only in Iceland, but also 
in other European and North American countries.128  Denmark has 
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an estimated 98 percent termination rate, the United Kingdom at 90 
percent, the U.S. at 85 percent, and France at 77 percent.129  The 
devaluation and eradication of the Down syndrome community is 
increasingly apparent on a global scale.  Yet without being able to 
shield disabled groups under genocide’s definitional umbrella of 
protection, their destruction cannot be sanctioned as such.130 
A. Prosecutor v. J.-P. Akayesu: A Judicial Model 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
created by the United Nations Security Council,131 is one judicial 
body that has significantly expanded the global jurisprudence of 
genocide.  Its dicta detailing who and what constitutes protected 
groups and destructive actions, specifically upon hearing 
Prosecutor v. J.-P. Akayesu in 1998,132 should be viewed as a 
preliminary model in efforts to update the Genocide Convention.  
This case centered on Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former mayor of Taba 
in Rwanda, who was tried for charges of genocide and crimes 
against humanity for his violent involvements against the Tutsi tribe 
in Rwanda.133  Under Akayesu’s orders, armed law enforcement, 
military troops, and other local officials in support of the opposing 
Hutu tribe systematically subjected Tutsi women to sexual violence, 
rape, and mutilation, often by more than one attacker and in 
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public.134  Under the ICTR’s analysis, Akayesu’s actions amounted 
to genocide, with between 500,000 and one million casualties.135 
The ICTR confirmed that all the elements required for genocide 
were met by: (1) differentiating between genocide with a specific 
intent for extermination or attempted extermination, and crimes 
against humanity as the persecution of civilian populations; (2) 
determining that the acts of sexual violence were systematically 
conducted against a protected group through a broader application 
of the categories in the Convention; and (3) satisfying the 
destructive requirement under the Convention, again through 
widening the Article II acts to incorporate others unnamed.136  As to 
the first finding, the ICTR innovatively ascertained presumptions of 
fact from which genocidal intent may be inferred in the absence of 
a confession from the accused.  The ICTR was able to infer that 
Akayesu possessed the requisite genocidal intent against the Tutsi 
tribe by examining: the general context of the perpetration of 
culpable acts directed against the same group; whether such acts 
were committed by the same offender or by others; the scale of the 
atrocities committed and their general nature; the commission of the 
crime in a certain region or country; and whether victims were 
deliberately and systematically targeted on account of their 
membership in a particular group while excluding members of other 
groups.137  As to the second finding, although Tutsis and Hutus 
shared the same language and culture, the ICTR departed from a 
strictly positivist approach to conclude that the Tutsi comprised an 
independent protected ethnic group.  The ICTR inevitably 
advocated for extending the Convention’s protection to any 
permanent group by focusing on other identifiable factors, such as 
the Tutsis’ geographic stability and immobility; determination by 
birth and irremediable association; differing social status as well-
educated and wealthy cattle breeders; and contrary physical 
characteristics as taller, lankier, and thinner-lipped peoples than the 
Hutu.138  As to the third finding, the ICTR essentially held that the 
Convention’s enumerated acts were too narrow, as written, to 
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capture the scope of destructive acts that establish genocide.139  The 
ICTR stated that bodily or mental torture; inhumane or degrading 
treatment; and persecution also fall under Article II(b).140  
Subsistence diets; systematic expulsion from homes; and reducing 
essential medical services below a minimum threshold also fall 
under Article II(c).141  Additionally, sexual mutilation; sterilization; 
forced birth control; separation of the sexes; prohibition of 
marriages; deliberate impregnation of women by another group’s 
man with the intent to birth a child of the father’s group (i.e. Hutu 
men raping and impregnating Tutsi women so that they would bear 
Hutu children); rape intended to prevent births when the victim 
subsequently refuses to procreate (i.e. raped Tutsi women no longer 
bearing any children); and people led through threats or trauma not 
to procreate also fall under Article II(d).142  While urging respect for 
the original drafters’ aims,143 the ICTR expanded the Convention’s 
application in a novel and necessary manner to hold otherwise 
fugitive wrongdoers accountable for their specific genocidal intent 
and systematic extermination of Tutsis in Rwanda. 
A similar analysis to the ICTR’s may now protect the Down 
syndrome community and ensure that the doctrine of genocide 
adapts to rapidly emergent methods of destruction, but the ICTR’s 
jurisdiction as an ad hoc tribunal is limited to applying the original 
Convention.144  Thus, the ICTR’s broader findings are not 
transferrable and not binding on other courts.  Until and unless the 
doctrine of genocide can take on a customary international law form 
or the Convention itself can be updated, subsets of the disability 
community cannot receive their due protection from eradication, 
despite being cognitively and physically marked by involuntary and 
irreversible abnormalities assigned at birth.  The ICTR’s perceptive 
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B. Alternate Legislative Lessons from the United States to 
Curb Genocidal Effects 
At present, prenatal genetic testing and the subsequent 
termination of fetuses with Down syndrome is legal in a range of 
countries, with laws differing as to an upper bound on the weeks at 
which termination during the pregnancy is permissible.  As 
discussed, however, pro-information laws in the U.S. have 
attempted to counter the rising termination rates by requiring that 
doctors and genetic counselors deliver positive information on 
developmental, educational, and psychosocial outcomes of children 
with Down syndrome, as well as helpful resources to aid with 
raising a cognitively impaired child.145  Pennsylvania’s Down 
Syndrome Information Act enacted in 2014, also known as Chloe’s 
Law named after a child with Down syndrome,146 and the federal 
counterpart, the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions 
Awareness Act enacted in 2008,147 are examples of U.S. pro-
information laws that initially received support across pro-life, pro-
choice, and disability activists before pro-life politicians took over 
the agenda.148  Yet one potential method to reap the benefits of 
prenatal testing while decreasing termination rates may be to amend 
the pro-information platform to a neutral mandate.  Country-
specific nonpartisan local and national legislation that require 
patients to receive neutral, nondirective evidence-based counseling 
from medical experts, on both the risks associated with Down 
syndrome and support services available, may enable parents to 
better contemplate and provide complete informed consent for 
subsequent actions.149  Pro-information laws have polarized pro-
choice advocates with their goal to deliberately spin Down 
syndrome in a solely positive light,150 whereas the Icelandic 
government’s opposing approach involves negative counseling 
from the perspective that Down syndrome is a complication that 
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should be terminated.151  Legislation mandating comprehensive and 
neutral counseling, and sanctioning the lack thereof, may again 
garner multilateral backing. 
A second potential method to avoid mass termination may be to 
increase funding for Down syndrome research and treatment 
innovations through federal and state legislation.  Diana Bianchi, a 
neonatal geneticist in the U.S. known for introducing highly 
accurate noninvasive prenatal tests in 2011, has been analyzing how 
the results from genetic screenings as early as 10 weeks of 
pregnancy can assist in developing drugs to address cognitive 
deficits in utero.152  Her research remains limited to safe and 
already-approved drugs, but a Texas hospital has prepared a trial of 
Prozac in pregnant women with Down syndrome fetuses and a 
scientist at Cornell has investigated supplementation with choline, 
an essential nutrient.153  Such treatments are intended to increase 
brain development in fetuses with Down syndrome, for which 
development typically slows down at 15 weeks of pregnancy, and 
to minimize post-birth cognitive impairment.154  This field of fetal 
personalized medicine,155 particularly used to repair cognitive and 
birth defects resulting from Down syndrome, has been slow in light 
of diminishing funding for the condition.  According to the Global 
Down Syndrome Foundation, Down syndrome is one of the least 
funded conditions in the U.S. and Congress has continually 
decreased funding to the National Institutes of Health for the 
condition since 2001.156  Increased information for parents, who 
have the choice to terminate or continue with an affected pregnancy, 
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C. Alternate Lessons from Global Regulatory Frameworks to 
Curb Genocidal Effects 
Genetic technologies span a varied regulatory landscape in the 
global context.  While some countries have attempted instating laws 
to control the use and means of genetic technologies, to date there 
is no international regulatory body or framework for gene editing or 
prenatal testing for genetic abnormalities.  In waiting for the 
development of such an international body, there are still lessons to 
be learned from existing country-specific frameworks.  The 
following two lessons may be adapted towards drafting policies 
against prenatal testing for the purpose of eliminating specific 
abnormalities in the global gene pool. 
One example is Germany’s Embryo Protection Act of 1990, 
which prohibits the alteration of human germ line cells and the 
harvesting of embryonic cells.157  The Act explains germ line cells 
as leading to fertilization and a resultant human being, and an 
embryo as an already fertilized human egg cell capable of 
developing.158  The Act exempts artificial fertilization or gene 
selection for the preservation of a child from “falling ill with 
Duchenne-type muscular dystrophy or a similar severe sex-linked 
genetic illness, and the illness threatening the child is recognized as 
being of appropriate severity.”159  Problematic is that the Act’s 
language does not explicitly define “severity.”160  South Korea’s 
Bioethics and Biosafety Act (“BioAct”) similarly restricts scientists 
from conducting genetic experiments and modifications on human 
embryos and genes, but neither the German nor the South Korean 
law specifies whether experiments on unviable embryos are 
prohibited.161  The scope of “viability”—or which embryonic 
characteristics are considered biologically survivable and, 
therefore, of greater consequence for gene editing—remains 
unclear, as well as the professional prospective from which viability 
is determined.  Transparently defining the bounds of viability from 
the licensed medical community and codifying the definition among 
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state agencies are actions of importance for prenatal genetic testing 
and counseling.  Individual choices aside, a plain definition would 
allow certain genetic abnormalities, such as Down syndrome, to be 
medically and standardly categorized as a more operational 
condition, should a fetus come to term, in comparison to other 
abnormalities, such as Patau syndrome, which is fatal within the 
first week of life.  Subsequent genetic counseling would be required 
to reflect this categorization of viability, with sanctions for state-
sponsored actors and organized programs that follow an otherwise 
pointed, mass abortion agenda. 
Another area of uncertainty between the laws of Germany and 
South Korea is which actions constitute gene therapy or 
modification.162  South Korea’s BioAct defines “gene therapy” as “a 
series of procedures to alter genes for the purpose of preventing or 
treating a disease,” but does not explain whether such actions span 
the administration of drugs, a procedure on embryonic cells, the 
reprogramming of DNA, or other methods of recombination or 
modification.163  Moreover, does Down syndrome fit the disease 
category? A cursory view of prenatal genetic screening, by itself, 
may not constitute therapy or modification, but the combined action 
of screening and counseling geared towards abortion, as in Iceland’s 
case, may very well constitute future genetic modification.  Narrow 
interpretations of “gene therapy” and “disease,” again codified into 
law with corresponding sanctions, may be warranted to capture the 
extent of actions with editing consequences. 
A second relevant example is the 1997 Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine (the Oviedo Convention), which also 
aspires to limit the misuse of scientific technologies, but similarly 
lacks the specific language required to clarify boundaries.  As of 
December 2011, 29 member states of the Council of Europe had 
ratified the Oviedo Convention, which supersedes individual 
nation-states’ legislation.164  The Oviedo Convention is purported to 
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be the first international text giving a common framework of 
bioethical principles to signatory states, and it intends to protect 
human dignity and identity from endangering biological and 
medical acts against the benefit of present and future generations.165  
Most relevant, Article 11 states that “any form of discrimination 
against a person on grounds of his or her genetic heritage is 
prohibited,” and Article 13 states: “An intervention seeking to 
modify the human genome may only be undertaken for preventive, 
diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to 
introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants 
[emphasis added].”166 
Actions to halt the reproduction of Down syndrome individuals 
in the future genome pool literally fit the Oviedo Convention’s 
prohibitions, but the problem lies in the generic language used and 
the simultaneous allowance that “scientific research in the field of 
biology and medicine shall be carried out freely . . . ensuring the 
protection of the human being.”167  If pregnant women choose to 
abort fetuses with Down syndrome as a result of targeted and 
systematic genetic counseling, and a subsequent generation of 
Down syndrome is eradicated, is this a “modification in the genome 
of any descendants” in the manner stated by the Oviedo 
Convention?  Does the eradication of Down syndrome peoples by 
way of genetic technologies constitute a protection or harm of 
human beings, human dignity, and human identity?  And who 
decides how human dignity is preserved?  Although a step in the 
right direction, the Oviedo Convention, like other global regulatory 
frameworks, misses the crucial opportunity to clearly categorize, 
standardize, and compare permitted actions from discriminatory 
ones. 
VI. Conclusion 
It is clear that disability does not fit into the current definition 
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for genocide—condition-specific groups do not constitute a 
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.  As such, Iceland’s 
actions and other countries following suit to eliminate Down 
syndrome cannot constitute genocide.  Yet the disability community 
has repeatedly experienced trauma.  Rather than arising from 
archetypal genocidal racism, ethnic cleansing, or armed conflict, 
such trauma has come from inherent biases and misrepresentations 
about disabled individuals that have continued on since the 
development of eugenics.168  Here, “the weapon of destruction is 
misguided scientific policy for the sake of ‘betterment of the 
whole.’”169  Thus, it is worth questioning why the Genocide 
Convention, embedded in immutable human rights and 
humanitarian legal principles, should remain as defined with a 
victim loophole and indistinct destructive acts.  This narrow 
classification permits unnamed groups—with otherwise proven 
chances of surviving and thriving—to be targeted and destroyed in 
whole or in part, merely by new technological means.  International 
and domestic legal frameworks are necessary to regulate 
advancements in science and medicine and, ultimately, prevent 
disguised discrimination.  Updating the Genocide Convention and 
instating linguistically clear legislation may be a decent start. 
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